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SELLING THE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BENEATH A 
RELIGIOUS MONUMENT THAT VIOLATES THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY OR 
INFRINGEMENT? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1802, Thomas Jefferson assured religious adherents that the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment were designed to erect “a wall of separation 
between Church and State.”1  Despite the tranquility that these words brought 
to the Danbury Baptists,2 the history of the United States is replete with 
“official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of religion’s 
role in American life.”3  From the words of the Founding Fathers transcribing 
their belief in God4 to the presence of religious monuments in public parks,5 
our history is full of instances evincing religion’s strong role in government.  
In fact, religion has been so intertwined with our history and government that it 
is almost inseparable.6 
Undoubtedly, our country is a religious nation,7 and although the total 
separation envisioned by Jefferson’s proverbial wall may not be feasible or 
required,8 the religion clauses were designed “to prevent, as far as possible, the 
[unnecessary] intrusion of either the church or the state into the precincts of the 
other.”9  Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the religion clauses and of the tests 
 
 1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (citing Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984)). 
 4. Id. at 683 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212–13 
(1963)). 
 5. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005); cf. Books v. 
Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 858–60 (7th Cir. 2005) (also describing religious works on public 
property, in this case depictions of the Ten Commandments inside County Administration 
Buildings); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing religious 
monument on City Municipal Building lawn). 
 6. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 687 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212; Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421, 434 (1962)). 
 7. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
 8. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
 9. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 
614). 
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articulated by the Supreme Court has been a convenient weapon for all sides of 
the current religious war being fought in America’s public parks.10 
Under the guise of secular memorials, religious organizations of every 
creed are seeking to promote their principles and beliefs by donating and 
constructing religious monuments on government property.11  Although non-
adherents and other religious organizations typically challenge the 
constitutionality of these religious monuments,12 their attempts to preserve 
their religious equality are often thwarted by creative governmental action and, 
in part, by the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate a fixed rule to evaluate 
these monuments.13  However, through the confusion it remains evident that a 
government may not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another.14 
Even when a constitutional challenge is successful, and a court determines 
that a monument violates the Establishment Clause, local governments, state 
governments, and Congress suspiciously seek alternative measures to prevent 
the removal of these unconstitutional religious monuments.15  Specifically, 
governments sell the monument and the property directly beneath it to a 
private party asserting that such action ameliorates the Establishment Clause 
violation, because the post-sale display of the monument represents the private 
religious speech of the new property owner.16  Typically, governments offer 
these “sales” exclusively to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness to 
preserve the monument.17  Even when the property is publicly offered for sale 
and additional bids are accepted, governments sometimes refuse to follow local 
 
 10. PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL: LANDMARK CASES FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS 
BATTLEFIELDS 2 (2007). 
 11. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that 
“there was a national effort to distribute as many as 5,000 monuments of the Ten Commandments 
throughout the country”). 
 12. See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (plurality 
opinion). 
 13. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–88 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 14. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994) 
(citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
 15. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 768–72 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying en banc 
review) (Congress passed statutes to hinder the removal of a Latin Cross), petition for cert. filed 
sub nom, Kempthorne v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2008) (No. 08-472), cert. 
granted sub nom., Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3458, 3467 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472); 
see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489–90 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (city sold the religious statue after suit was filed). 
 16. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491. 
 17. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 781 (Congress did not open the bidding for the property to the 
general public); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2005) (property 
was solely offered to the original donor of the monument); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 
(City did not solicit alternative bids for the property). 
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law and, despite higher bids, engineer their way out of selling the property to a 
bidder who has not demonstrated a willingness to preserve the monument.18 
This note will analyze whether the sale of a constitutionally infringing 
monument and the government property beneath it is sufficient to cure the 
Establishment Clause violation and whether it is permissible under the 
Constitution.  Section II briefly surveys the Supreme Court’s turbulent 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence pertaining to religious monuments in 
public parks.  Section III analyzes possible remedial options for curing an 
unconstitutional display of a religious monument in a public park.  Section IV 
provides this author’s analysis of whether the overwhelming presumption that 
a sale of government property beneath an unconstitutional monument is 
sufficient to protect religious equality and whether the presumption, as applied, 
conforms to the principles of the Constitution.  Section V concludes with this 
author’s proposal for a standard that is not prone to manipulation and that 
would provide more protection for the sacred right of religious equality. 
II.  SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion. . . .”19  Though this language is explicitly directed at 
Congress, the First Amendment has been incorporated and made applicable to 
the States and localities through the Fourteenth Amendment.20 
The Establishment Clause has generated much controversy, because 
governmental action “respecting the establishment of religion” is not easily 
identifiable.21  Specifically, although governmental action might not 
“establish” a religion, an action may “respect an establishment” by merely 
being a step that could eventually lead to an establishment of religion.22  
Furthermore, being that the Establishment Clause resembles an objective more 
than an applicable statute, the Supreme Court has been unsuccessful in its 
attempts to articulate a rule that works for all instances to decipher whether 
governmental conduct violates the Establishment Clause.23  In fact, the 
opaqueness of the Establishment Clause has led various Supreme Court 
Justices to propose different approaches to determine when the outer limits of 
 
 18. See Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005) (the City 
awarded the property to the original donor although its bid was smaller than those of its 
competitors). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 20. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). 
 21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). 
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the Clause are breached.24  Regardless of the test employed, defining whether 
governmental conduct violates the Establishment Clause requires an extremely 
fact-intensive inquiry.25 
A. The Lemon Test 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court adopted a tripartite analysis to 
scrutinize governmental conduct under the Establishment Clause and to protect 
against “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the 
sovereign in religious activity.”26  The “Lemon test” provides that government 
conduct must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal or primary effect 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster “an excessive 
entanglement with religion.”27  If governmental action violates any of these 
principles, it violates the Establishment Clause.28 
In Stone v. Graham, the first case dealing with the display of religious 
symbols on government property, the Supreme Court employed the Lemon test 
to analyze a Kentucky statute that required the Ten Commandments to be 
posted on the walls of public school classrooms.29  The court held that because 
the mandatory posting of the Ten Commandments had a preeminent religious 
purpose, it violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test.30  The court also 
noted that an “avowed” secular purpose would be insufficient to avoid conflict 
with the Establishment Clause.31 
 
 24. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLUME 2: 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 157 (2008) (noting five approaches by Supreme Court members 
as “(1) the threefold test of Lemon v. Kurtzman…(2) endorsement, (3) consistency with historical 
practice or understanding, (4) coercion, and (5) decision of specific issues in light of the values of 
nonestablishment but without any guiding standard”). See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (noting the 
Supreme Court’s repeated unwillingness to be confined to a single test or criterion for evaluating 
Establishment Clause cases). 
 25. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
 27. Id. at 612–13; Id. at 625 (holding that state statutes consisting of salary supplements paid 
to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools and reimbursement of nonpublic schools for 
teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials used in the teaching of specific secular 
subjects promoted secular purpose, but involved the excessive entanglement of the State with 
religion). 
 28. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980). 
 29. Id. at 39–41. 
 30. Id. at 41–43 (noting that instilling values and illustrating the connection between the Ten 
Commandments and the current legal system were possible secular motives). 
 31. Id. at 41. 
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B. The Endorsement Test 
Four years later, the Supreme Court again applied the Lemon test to 
evaluate the display of a religious symbol on public property.32  In Lynch v. 
Donnelly, the court analyzed whether the inclusion of a crèche in the City of 
Pawtucket’s Christmas display, which also included a Santa Clause house, a 
Christmas tree, and a Seasons Greetings banner, violated the Establishment 
Clause.33  In upholding the constitutionality of the display, the court concluded 
that the purposes of the city’s display, to celebrate the Christmas holiday and 
to depict its origins, were purely secular.34  Additionally, the court held that 
although the display of the crèche may incidentally benefit Christianity, the 
benefit conferred was merely an indirect result of recognizing the origins of the 
Christmas holiday and was insufficient to have an effect of advancing or 
endorsing religion.35 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor articulated and proposed a new 
“endorsement” test that sought to clarify the effect and purpose prongs of the 
Lemon test.36  Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test condemns any 
governmental favoritism of religion, because it “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community.”37  Justice O’Connor also 
indicated that when analyzed under the endorsement test, Lemon’s purpose 
prong inquires “whether the government intends to convey a message of 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”38  Similarly, the endorsement 
approach construes Lemon’s effect prong as an inquiry into whether “a 
government practice. . . [has] the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion[,]” regardless of whether 
the effect was intentional.39 
The endorsement test also indicated that the determination of whether the 
government has acted in a manner that creates the impression of endorsement 
 
 32. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679–80 (1984). 
 33. Id. at 671, 687. 
 34. Id. at 681. 
 35. Id. at 683.  The Court also determined that the display of the crèche did not excessively 
entangle the government and Christianity, because there was no evidence of “comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance” of the display or any contact between the 
church and the government pertaining to the display at all.  Id. at 684 (quoting Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)). 
 36. Id. at 691–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor concluded that the City of 
Pawtucket’s display of the crèche is not an endorsement of the Christian faith, but is instead a 
display celebrating a public holiday.  Id. at 692. 
 37. Lynch, 485 U.S. at 688. 
 38. Id. at 691. 
 39. Id. at 692. 
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depends on the message as interpreted by a “reasonable observer.”40  Justice 
O’Connor noted that this reasonable observer is more informed than a mere 
“casual passerby”41 and “must be deemed aware of the history of the conduct 
in question and must understand [the symbol’s] place in our Nation’s cultural 
landscape.”42 
In its first application of the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a 
crèche erected on the grand staircase of the County Courthouse and a menorah 
erected in front of the City-County Building during the holiday season violated 
the Establishment Clause.43  Noting that the crèche was the focal point of the 
County Courthouse’s holiday display and that there was nothing detracting 
from its religious message, the court held that the crèche was displayed in a 
manner that sent an “unmistakable message” that the county supports and 
promotes the Christian message.44  However, the court held that the display of 
the menorah, which was next to the county’s 45-foot Christmas tree and a sign 
saluting liberty, did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it was 
unlikely that it conveyed a message that the government was endorsing the 
beliefs associated with the menorah and denouncing all other religions.45 
C. Ostensible and Predominate Purpose 
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Supreme Court analyzed 
the constitutionality of two Kentucky Counties’ decisions to construct large 
displays of the Ten Commandments in their respective courthouses.46  Shortly 
after the suits challenging the displays commenced, the Counties expanded the 
Ten Commandments displays to include American historical documents but 
emphasized and focused on the documents’ religious passages and references 
to God.47  Subsequently, the district court awarded a preliminary injunction 
requiring the removal of the displays, but the Counties again amended the 
displays to include several more secular documents of historical and legal 
significance to the United States.48 
 
 40. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778–779 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 779. 
 42. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 43. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579–81, 587 
(1989). 
 44. Id. at 598–600. 
 45. Id. at 620. 
 46.  McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 47. Id. at 852–54, 869–70. 
 48. Id. at 854–56. 
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In analyzing the Counties’ actions, a plurality of the Supreme Court noted 
that “[w]hen the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose 
of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of 
[maintaining] official religious neutrality. . . .”49 Additionally, “an 
understanding of official objective emerges from readily discoverable fact, 
without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”50  The court 
elaborated that the eyes that inquire into the government’s “purpose belong to 
an ‘objective observer,’ who takes account of the traditional external signs that 
show up in the ‘text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ or 
comparable official act.”51 
The McCreary Court also noted that when determining whether 
governmental action has a secular purpose, the legislature’s stated reasons will 
generally receive deference if the purpose is “genuine, not a sham, and not 
merely secondary to a religious objective.”52  However, government action is 
unconstitutional when the “openly available data support[s] a commonsense 
conclusion that a religious objective permeate[s] [from] the government’s 
action.”53  Additionally, when the claim is an apparent sham or the secular 
purpose is secondary, courts have found that there is not a sufficient secular 
objective in the government’s action.54 
In scrutinizing the Counties’ actions, the Supreme Court held that a 
reasonable observer would not be able to turn a blind eye to the government’s 
religious intention that motivated expanding the earlier displays nor accept the 
claim that the Counties had cast off their previous religious objectives in 
erecting the subsequent displays.55  Accordingly, the court held that the 
Counties’ actions violated the Establishment Clause, because their purpose in 
expanding the display was, despite their secular assertions, to keep the Ten 
Commandment monuments in the courthouses.56 
 
 49. Id. at 860. 
 50. Id. at 862 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 51. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 
290, 308 (2000)). 
 52. Id. at 864. 
 53. Id. at 863. 
 54. Id. at 865.  Cf. id. at 902 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that an exclusive purpose to 
foster or assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating). 
 55. Id. at 869–70. 
 56. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 873.  See also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. 
Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009). (noting, in dictum, that “[t]he message that a government entity conveys 
by allowing a monument to remain on its property may . . . be altered by the subsequent addition 
of other monuments in the same vicinity.”). 
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D. Nature and National History of the Monument 
On the same day that McCreary County was decided, a different plurality 
of the Supreme Court decided another Establishment Clause case involving 
religious monuments that further blurred Establishment Clause jurisprudence.57  
Van Orden v. Perry involved a challenge to the placement of a monument of 
the Ten Commandments, donated by a private organization, on the grounds of 
the Texas State Capitol, which also displayed 17 other monuments and 21 
historical markers commemorating the “people, ideals, and events that 
compose Texan identity.”58 
In analyzing the passive display, a plurality of the court held that the 
Lemon test is not useful.59  Instead, the plurality indicated that the court’s 
analysis should be “driven both by the nature of the monument and by our 
Nation’s history.”60  Furthermore, the plurality noted that the Establishment 
Clause is not violated if a monument simply has religious content or promotes 
a message consistent with religious doctrine.61  Ultimately, the plurality held 
that the placement of the Ten Commandments monument did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, because the monument served both a religious and 
secular purpose by being included in a group of monuments that represented 
several strands of Texas’s political and legal history.62 
In his concurring and controlling opinion, Justice Breyer indicated that the 
context of the passive display must be examined and it must be determined as 
to how the text is being used.63  Accordingly, Justice Breyer concluded that the 
display of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol 
grounds did not infringe the Establishment Clause, because it served a mixed, 
but primarily nonreligious, purpose.64 
III.  REMEDIAL MEASURES TO CURE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS 
Governments could avoid several Establishment Clause problems and the 
accompanying litigation by merely refraining from erecting monuments and 
displays that use religious words and symbols;65 but an aggrieved party is 
nonetheless often forced to seek vindication of his religious rights in the 
judicial arena.  Accordingly, aggrieved parties are forced to seek or must 
 
 57. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 58. Id. at 681. 
 59. Id. at 686.  The plurality did not opine, however, on the Lemon test’s fate in the larger 
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 690. 
 62. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92. 
 63. Id. at 700–01 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 703. 
 65. GREENAWALT, supra note 24, at 69. 
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threaten to seek a judicial remedy that is designed to restore them, as nearly as 
possible, to the position they would have been in but for the wrong of the other 
party.66  Especially, in the constitutional realm, it is important for a remedy to 
closely fit the asserted violation.67 
A. Governmental Removal of an Unconstitutional Religious Display 
Given that the costs associated with defending an alleged Establishment 
Clause violation are often great, governments occasionally seek to avoid these 
expenses by removing the alleged infringement on the mere threat of judicial 
intervention.68  However, even a government’s decision to remove an alleged 
infringement is occasionally challenged on constitutional grounds.69  In 
Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County’s decision to remove a 
cross from its official Seal was challenged on the ground that the removal was 
motivated by the County’s disapproval of, and hostility toward, the Christian 
faith.70  However, the County defended the removal by asserting that it was 
seeking to avoid a potential Establishment Clause violation.71 
Agreeing with the County, the Ninth Circuit held that the County’s 
decision to remove a potentially infringing symbol or display in order to avoid 
an Establishment Clause violation has a secular purpose.72  Additionally, the 
court noted that a reasonable observer could not possibly conceive the effect of 
the County’s decision to remove the religious symbol from its seal as a 
disapproval of, or hostility toward, the associated religious beliefs.73  Instead, 
the court determined it was more reasonable that the County’s efforts would be 
perceived as an attempt to restore neutrality to its seal and to ensure 
compliance with the Establishment Clause.74  Accordingly, the court held the 
removal of a religious symbol or display in order to avoid a potential 
Establishment Clause violation does not, in itself, violate the Establishment 
Clause.75 
 
 66. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958). 
 67. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996). 
 68. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 69. Id. at 1248. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1255.  In perceiving the governmental action as a desire to return to neutrality, as 
opposed to hostility towards particular religious beliefs, the Court noted that the removal came 
only after the presence of crosses on several other seals had been held unconstitutional.   Id. at 
1257. 
 73. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1257. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1258. 
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B. Injunction for Removal of the Unconstitutional Religious Display 
An aggrieved party will typically have to seek judicial intervention to 
protect its religious rights.  Accordingly, when it has been determined that a 
permanent religious monument on government property violates the 
Establishment Clause, the traditional remedy has been for a court to award an 
injunction mandating the monument’s removal.76  However, even these court-
mandated removals are occasionally challenged on constitutional grounds.77 
In McGinley v. Houston, after the district court issued an injunction 
requiring the removal of a monument depicting the Ten Commandments from 
the Alabama Supreme Court’s rotunda, the injunction was challenged on the 
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause by favoring “a nontheistic 
religion/faith.”78  The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this claim as meritless.79  
Specifically, the court held that the government’s removal of an 
unconstitutional religious monument does not discriminate against the 
religious beliefs associated with the monument being removed or favor “a 
nontheistic religion/faith”; but, instead, the governmental action was purely 
secular.80  The court additionally noted that if this claim had merit “an 
Establishment Clause violation could never be cured, because every time a 
violation is found and cured by the removal of the statute or practice that cure 
itself would violate the Establishment Clause by leaving behind empty 
space.”81 
C. Sale of Government Property Beneath an Unconstitutional Religious 
Monument 
Instead of complying with an injunction mandating the removal of an 
unconstitutional religious monument on government property, governments 
often attempt to remedy the Establishment Clause violation by selling the 
monument and the property directly beneath it to a private party.82  Despite this 
sale, courts agree that “the presence of a religious symbol on once-public 
land. . .may still violate the Establishment Clause.”83  In determining whether 
the sale of the monument and property beneath it passes constitutional muster, 
the court must, on a transaction by transaction basis, examine “both the form 
 
 76. See, e.g., McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 77. See, e.g., id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1332. 
 80. Id. at 1333. 
 81. McGinley, 361 F.3d at 1332. 
 82. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489–
90 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 83. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Buono v. Norton, 371 
F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
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and substance of the transaction to determine whether the governmental action 
endorsing religion has actually ceased.”84  However, in analyzing the sale of 
the unconstitutional religious monument and the property beneath it, the 
United States Circuit Courts are divided on whether the sale is sufficient to end 
an Establishment Clause violation.85 
1. Presumption of Constitutionality 
The Seventh Circuit and a District Court in the Fourth Circuit have held 
that “absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective way 
for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”86  These 
courts have also noted that this formalistic standard is prone to governmental 
manipulation.87  Nevertheless, they have indicated that inquiring into the form 
and substance of the transaction is sufficient to determine whether the 
governmental endorsement has actually ceased.88  Furthermore, these courts 
have held that a governmental decision to sell the monument site to end an 
Establishment Clause violation serves a purely secular purpose.89 
The Seventh Circuit got its first glimpse of this issue in Freedom from 
Religious Foundation v. City of Marshfield, where the City of Marshfield 
accepted a statue of Jesus Christ with his arms open in prayer standing atop a 
large sphere, which bore the inscription “Christ Guide Us On Our Way.”90  
The statue was placed on undeveloped city property and in a manner that made 
it visible to travelers on the city’s main highway.91  Marshfield subsequently 
developed the property around the statue in order for it to be used as a public 
park.92  After much objection to the statue’s presence in the park and 
Marshfield’s repeated refusal to remove the statue, suit was filed.93  Shortly 
 
 84. Id. at 778–79 (citing City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491). 
 85. See id. at 779 n.13 (rejecting Seventh Circuit presumption permitting sale or transfer of 
land, absent unusual circumstances). See also Respondent’s Brief in Opposition of Certiorari, 
Salazar v. Buono, 527 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (U.S. Feb. 23, 
2009) (No. 08-472) (asking the Supreme Court “[w]hether, after a court has held that the presence 
of a sectarian religious symbol on government land violates the Establishment Clause, the transfer 
of that land perpetuates the Establishment Clause violation. . . .”). 
 86. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of the Eagles 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting City 
of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. 
Md. 2005) (quoting same).  These courts assert that the Establishment Clause violation ends when 
the property is sold, because the post-sale display represents the expression of the private 
purchaser, not of the government.  See, e.g., City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491. 
 87. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 700. 
 88. Id. (quoting City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491). 
 89. See id. at 705; Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
 90. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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thereafter, Marshfield erected a disclaimer that indicated the presence of the 
statue does not reflect an endorsement of the associated religious message.94  
Subsequently, Marshfield sold the property beneath the statue to a private party 
who held views consistent with the monument’s message.95 
In analyzing the sale, the Seventh Circuit agreed with Marshfield’s 
contention that the sale of the property effectively ended Marshfield’s religious 
expression, because the property owner was in exclusive control of the 
expression that takes place on the property after the sale.96  Furthermore, 
because the price was fair and because the necessary formalities required by 
state law were performed to consummate the sale, the court concluded that 
there were no extraordinary circumstances that evinced that the city endorsed a 
religion by deciding to sell the property to a religious organization.97  
However, the court concluded that the sale failed to end the perception of 
government endorsement and granted the private purchaser preferential access 
to the city’s park, because the private property was not visibly differentiated 
from the city’s park in any sufficient way.98  In dicta, the court indicated that, 
in order to end the perception of endorsement, the city should erect a structure 
that clearly defines the private property and should maintain a clearly visible 
disclaimer.99 
The Seventh Circuit got another look at the issue five years later in 
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, where the City of LaCrosse granted the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles permission to erect a monument of the Ten 
Commandments in a public park.100  After the city’s approval to erect the 
monument, the city was inundated by severe flooding, and the monument was 
ultimately dedicated to those who helped during the flood.101  After the 
monument was unveiled, the city refused multiple requests to remove the 
monument and to move it to a private location.102  Instead, without a public 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.  The statue was originally donated by the Knights of 
Columbus and was ultimately sold to the Henry Praschak Memorial Fund, Inc.  Id. at 489–90.  
Henry Praschak was a member of the Knights of Columbus and helped with the development of 
the park.  Id. at 489. 
 96. Id. at 491.  As a result of the sale, Marshfield no longer owns the property on which the 
religious expression occurs and, therefore, the sale ended Marshfield’s religious expression and 
cured any Establishment Clause violations.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 492–93. 
 98. Id. at 497. 
 99. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497 (indicating that installing a permanent fence or wall 
would be sufficient to clearly express that the speech was expressive conduct of the private 
owner). 
 100. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 694–95 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 101. Id. at 696. 
 102. Id. 
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offering, the city sold the property beneath the monument to the Eagles.103  
Upon taking possession of the property, the Eagles erected a fence around the 
monument and a disclaimer, which indicated that the property was privately 
owned and the religious beliefs associated with the monument were those of 
the Eagles.104 
Despite the city offering the property solely to the original donor, an entity 
that had demonstrated its willingness to preserve the monument, the Seventh 
Circuit noted that the city’s decision to sell the property was motivated by the 
purely secular intention to end a perceived endorsement.105  The court 
ultimately concluded that there were no unusual circumstances to call into 
question the constitutionality of the sale; and, therefore, the sale of the property 
effectively ended the Establishment Clause violation.106  Additionally, the 
court noted that the extensive efforts taken to sell the property, erect a fence, 
and display signs would overcome a reasonable observer’s perception that the 
religious message of the monument was being endorsed by the city.107 
In Chambers v. City of Fredrick, a stone copy of the Ten Commandments 
was placed in one of Fredrick’s public parks, in a manner that made it visible 
from one of the city’s main roads.108  In light of the growing controversies 
surrounding the constitutionality of the monument, the local Fraternal Order of 
Eagles, which donated the monument to Fredrick, offered to purchase all or 
part of the grounds upon which the monument rested.109  After the city decided 
that it would be in its best interest to sell the property beneath the monument, 
three additional offers to purchase the property were received and several 
additional bids were solicited.110  However, despite the fact that the Eagles did 
not submit the highest bid, the property was sold to the Eagles upon the city’s 
determination that it was the logical and best bidder to maintain the 
property.111  The sale was subsequently challenged on the ground that it failed 
to ameliorate the Establishment Clause violation, because the transaction was a 
sham designed to permit the continued display of the monument.112 
 
 103. Id. at 697. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705. 
 106. Id. at 701–03 (indicating, in dicta, that unusual circumstances would be (1) “a sale that 
did not comply with applicable state law governing the sale of land by a municipality,” (2) “a sale 
to a straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power to exercise the duties of ownership,” 
or (3) “a sale well below fair market value resulting in a gift to a religious organization”). 
 107. Id. at 703–04. 
 108. Chambers v. City of Fredrick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569–70 (D. Md. 2005). 
 109. Id. at 570 (the sale of the property also included the land beneath an additional 
monument that included the names of individuals buried on the grounds). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 571–72. 
 112. Id. 
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Adhering to the presumption articulated by the Seventh Circuit, the court 
determined that, despite the fact that the city failed to adhere to local 
requirements for the sale of public land and failed to award the property to the 
highest bidder, there were no unusual circumstances to make the sale of the 
property suspect.113  Although the monument’s location might convey the 
impression to a passerby that Fredrick is endorsing its message, the court 
concluded that a reasonable observer would understand that the property was 
sold to dissociate Fredrick with any message the monument conveys.114  
Accordingly, the court determined that a reasonable observer would take 
comfort in the fact that the Eagles, being the original owner of the monument, 
was the logical purchaser for the property and would not conclude that the sale 
was intended to advance the religion associated with the monument.115  
Accordingly, the court held that the sale of the property and the monument’s 
continued display did not infringe the Establishment Clause.116 
2. Rejecting the Presumption 
In the most recent challenge to a sale of property beneath an 
unconstitutional religious display, the Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the 
approach followed by the other circuits, indicated that the substance of a 
transaction for the sale of government property beneath an unconstitutional 
religious display must be analyzed on a transaction-by-transaction basis to 
determine whether the Establishment Clause violation has actually ceased.117  
However, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the presumption that a sale of 
government property is an effective cure to the Establishment Clause 
violation.118  Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted that, typically, “constitutional 
violations are not presumptively cured when control is transferred from public 
to private hands.”119 
 
 113. Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 114. Id. at 573.  The court’s analysis dubiously indicates that it is irrelevant to a reasonable 
observer, who is “aware of the history and context” of the display, that the procedures for selling 
public property were not adhered to nor was the property conveyed to the individual with the 
highest bid.  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (“Where the tradition of 
municipal control had become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere 
substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector.”); 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (lack of formal public control over election primary 
“immaterial” to analysis of constitutional violation)). 
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In Buono v. Kempthorne,120 an eight-foot Latin cross, which rests atop 
“Sunrise Rock” in the Mojave National Preserve, was challenged on the 
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause.121  After a request to 
construct a Buddhist shrine near the cross was denied, the National Park 
Service (“NPS”) announced its intention to remove the cross.122  However, 
upon notice of the NPS’s intentions, the United States Congress passed a series 
of laws designed to preserve the cross’s display.123 
Shortly before a panel of the Ninth Circuit heard and affirmed the district 
court’s permanent injunction, Congress enacted a final bill that authorized a 
land exchange for the area directly beneath and immediately surrounding the 
cross with the original donor, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”).124  
Undeterred by the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the injunction, the 
government began moving forward with the proposed land exchange.125  
However, after motions were filed, the district court ordered the government to 
comply with the permanent injunction and prohibited implementation of the 
land exchange.126  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the land 
exchange was an attempt to evade the injunction by scrutinizing three aspects 
of the exchange: “(1) the government’s continuing oversight and rights in the 
site containing the cross after the proposed land exchange; (2) the method for 
 
 120. 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-
472). 
 121. Id. at 768.  A wooden cross was first erected at this location by the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars.  This controversy spawned when the National Parks Service denied the request of an 
individual seeking to build a Buddhist shrine near the cross.  Id. at 769. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 769.  In December 2000, Congress passed its first piece of legislation, which 
prohibited the use of government funds to remove the cross.  Id.  In March 2001, suit was filed in 
district court challenging the constitutionality of the cross’s continued presence in the Preserve.  
Id. at 770.  However, while suit was pending and before the district court was able to determine 
whether the continued display of the cross violated the Establishment Clause, Congress 
designated the cross a “national memorial commemorating [the] United States participation in 
World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war.”  Id.  (quoting Department of 
Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2278-79 
(2002) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2002)).  Subsequently, the district court issued a 
permanent injunction prohibiting the continued display of the cross.  Id. at 771.  In response, 
Congress passed a bill prohibiting federal funds from being used to dismantle any national 
monuments commemorating the United States’ participation in World War I. Id. (quoting 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 
(2003)). 
 124. Id. at 771 (citing Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 
8121, 117 Stat. 1100 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 410 (2003)). 
 125. Buono, 527 F.3d at 773. 
 126. Id. 
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effectuating the land exchange; and (3) the history of the government’s efforts 
to preserve the cross.”127 
First, in analyzing the role the government would play in the continued 
oversight of the property after the exchange, the court held that the 
government’s ongoing supervision, maintenance, and oversight responsibilities 
coupled with its reversionary interest permitted it to retain substantial rights 
and control over the property despite the transfer of ownership to the VFW.128  
Next, the court noted that method of sale was peculiar, because the land 
exchange was made by Congress without holding a hearing and was deeply 
buried in an appropriations bill.129  It was also noted that Congress transferred 
the land without holding a public auction or notice and transferred the land to 
the monument’s original donor, who had a “significant interest and personal 
investment in preserving the cross that had been ordered removed.”130  The 
court concluded that these facts demonstrate that the government had an 
unusual role in the transaction and provided additional evidence that the 
government was attempting to circumvent the injunction.131  Lastly, the court 
indicated that the government’s efforts to preserve the display of the cross 
were “herculean” and led to the “undeniable conclusion that the government’s 
[purpose] was to keep the cross in place.”132  Accordingly, the court held that 
the land exchange was merely a ploy designed to circumvent the injunction 
and keep the Latin cross in place.133 
The Ninth Circuit also analyzed whether the improper endorsement of 
religion ceased as a result of the land exchange.134  A reasonable observer, the 
court noted, would undoubtedly be aware of “the governmental attempts to 
preserve [the cross] and its denial of access to other religious symbols.”135  
Accordingly, the court held that the land exchange was an improper 
endorsement of religion, enjoined the government from effectuating the land 
 
 127. Id. at 779. 
 128. Id. at 779, 781.  “NPS retains overall management and supervision of the Preserve.  NPS 
is responsible for ‘the supervision, management, and control’ of national memorials…The 
transfer of land to the VFW is conditioned on the VFW’s maintenance of the conveyed property 
as a memorial to World War I veterans.  The Secretary must carry out its duties under § 8137, 
which provides $10,000 for NPS to acquire and install replicas of the original cross and plaque.  
The property ‘shall revert’ to government ownership if ‘it is no longer being maintained as a war 
memorial.’”  Id. at 779. 
 129. Id. at 781. 
 130. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781. 
 131. Id. at 781–82. 
 132. Id. at 782. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Buono, 527 F.3d at 782–83. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SELLING THE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BENEATH A RELIGIOUS MONUMENT 317 
exchange, and required the government to comply with the original injunction 
requiring the removal of the cross.136 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
When the government transacts to sell a religious monument that violates 
the Establishment Clause and the property beneath the monument, the 
transaction typically grants the property owner exclusive control over the use 
of the property and, thus, arguably ends any Establishment Clause violation.137  
However, despite the sale, a religious monument’s presence on once-public 
land may be problematic.138  In analyzing these transactions, most courts rely 
on the illogical presumption that these sales are constitutional.  Furthermore, 
the manner in which the courts have analyzed the circumstances surrounding 
these transactions is insufficient to protect against even the most blatant 
manipulations.  In fact, most of the transactions analyzed by courts are 
problematic and infringe not only the principles of the Establishment Clause, 
but also the Free Speech and the Equal Protection Clauses.  Additionally, when 
the government decides to sell its property after a court has issued an order 
mandating the monument’s removal, the government’s action amounts to 
contempt for the court’s inherent powers. 
A. Presumption 
Most courts have adopted the presumption that a sale of the government’s 
property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument is sufficient to end an 
Establishment Clause violation, unless “unusual circumstances” are present.139  
These courts expressly note that this standard is highly susceptible to 
manipulation.140  However, they are confident that scrutinizing the form and 
substance of these transactions will enable it to sufficiently decipher whether 
the Establishment Clause violation has ceased.141 
In light of the circumstances that typically surround a sale of an 
unconstitutional religious monument and the government property beneath it, 
the presumption is insufficient to protect religious equality.  First, the mere fact 
that a sale is being conducted should draw into question the veracity of the 
 
 136. Id. at 782–83. 
 137. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 
2000).  See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 786 (1995) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[A]n unattended display (and any message it conveys) can naturally be 
viewed as belonging to the owner of the lane on which it stands.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Buono, 527 F.3d at 778. 
 139. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005); City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491; Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 
2005). 
 140. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491. 
 141. Id. 
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government’s asserted secular purpose.  Suspicion should arise from the 
government’s decision to forgo removing the monument and, instead, design a 
transaction that virtually guarantees the monument’s continued display.  
Additionally, unlike a transaction for sale, a decision to remove the monument 
is not susceptible to manipulation and ends the Establishment Clause violation 
without an adverse impact on the constitutional rights of others.142  Second, 
since the government property is typically only offered for sale when threats of 
removal emerge, the sale appears to be a non-remedial measure designed to 
preserve the display of the monument and to avoid the commands of the 
Establishment Clause.143  Finally, because the government has previously 
granted a religious organization preferential access to display its monument, 
courts should be skeptic of its later decision to sell a part of its public park to 
these same organizations.  In fact, a government that has previously granted a 
preference to a religious monument should not be presumed to act within the 
bounds of the Constitution when it has opted to sell its property as opposed to 
merely removing the monument.  In dealing with a right as sacred as religious 
freedom, more caution is necessary than a “formalistic standard” that runs a 
high risk of manipulation. 
Nevertheless, courts heavily rely on the presumption that the sale ends an 
Establishment Clause violation.  In fact, sales are typically upheld on the 
complainant’s inability to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction are unusual.144  While this presumption correctly recognizes the 
need for a fact-intensive inquiry into a government’s decision to sell its 
property,145 the typical factors that could rebut the presumption, as applied by 
the courts, have proven trivial and insufficient to protect against even the most 
blatant manipulations. 
One of the initial factors courts analyze when scrutinizing a sale is whether 
the transaction conforms to state and local law for the sale of public 
 
 142. Id. at 491–92. 
 143. The presumption appears to be endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell off 
patches of government land to various religious denominations as a means of circumventing the 
Establishment Clause.  See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702.  In the unlikely event that a monument that 
carried a message which the administrator of the public forum disagreed with, the administrator 
would undoubtedly remove the monument as opposed to selling the property.  This evinces the 
great need for these transactions to be viewed in a suspicious light. 
 144. See id. at 703 (indicating that the circumstances “do not entail the ‘unusual 
circumstances’ that would otherwise override the type of legitimate sale approved by [City of] 
Marshfield”); Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (upholding the constitutionality of a sale where 
the city failed to comply with its procedural requirements for the sale of public land and did not 
award the sale to the highest bidder; instead subjectively determined that the original donor was 
the only bidder that would be able to comply with the covenants and take care of the monument 
property). 
 145. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702. 
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property.146  Adherence to state and local law is often used by courts to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of the sale;147 however, courts have failed to even 
question a sale when the government fails to adhere to local laws or 
procedures.148  Furthermore, when the government permits—or accepts—bids 
from multiple entities to purchase the property, courts have failed to become 
suspicious of a government’s decision to sell the property to the original donor 
of the monument, despite the submission of higher bids.149 
Merely looking to whether a government complied with state or local law 
is insufficient to analyze the legitimacy of a transaction because often no 
alternative bids are permitted enabling the government to select and sell its 
property to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness to preserve the 
monument.150  By failing to permit other bids, the government can effectively 
alleviate the risk of the sale going to a bidder that will remove or change the 
monument.151  However, despite this blatant manipulation, courts have failed 
to deem the exclusive offering as an unusual enough circumstance to call into 
question the legitimacy of the transaction.152 
Third, courts often inspect the deed of sale to ensure that the government 
does not retain rights that would permit it to exert extensive control over the 
property or the manner in which it is subsequently used.153  Particularly, courts 
analyze whether there is a restrictive covenant or a reversionary clause that 
prohibits the purchaser from exercising the rights typically held by a property 
owner.154  However, courts are hardly suspicious of a transaction even when a 
restrictive covenant that mandates that the property be used in a particular 
 
 146. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492. 
 147. See id. (the sale of the property complied with the applicable state law); Mercier, 395 
F.3d at 702 (the sale complied with state law). 
 148. See Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
 149. See id. (noting that the original donor bid less for the property than other bidders). 
 150. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (Congress did not open the 
bidding to the general public, but directed the land to be transferred to the original donor, who has 
actively sought to preserve the cross’s display); Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702–03 (City offered the 
property exclusively to the original donor of the monument); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489–
92 (City did not solicit alternative bids, but sold to an organization commemorating a member of 
the organization that donated the monument). 
 151. When the government permits only a single bidder, the fact that the sale complies with 
state or local law seems to become irrelevant to the courts.  See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 
492. 
 152. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702–03 (finding no unusual circumstances, despite fact that the 
property was offered solely to the original donor); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492–93 
(finding no unusual circumstances despite fact that no alternative bids were solicited). 
 153. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781; City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492. 
 154. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 780 (government retained a reversionary interest that triggers if 
the property is not being used in a particular manner); City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 (a 
restrictive covenant was included in the deed of sale limiting the purchaser’s use of the property). 
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manner is included in the deed of sale.155  In fact, only after a court disregarded 
the presumption of constitutionality has a reversionary clause, which set forth 
the manner in which the property was to be used post-sale, cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the sale.156 
Fourth, some courts consider the location of the property being sold as 
relevant.157 However, attempting to distinguish public parks from other 
government property is futile for the determination of whether the sale 
sufficiently ends an Establishment Clause violation.  Specifically, a legitimate 
sale of government property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument 
requires governmental action that sufficiently distances the government from 
the monument’s message.  Accordingly, beyond the determination of whether 
the sale of the location is permissible under state or local law, the location of 
the property is irrelevant for the determination of whether the government is 
distancing itself from the monument’s message.158 
Finally, courts often scrutinize the price at which the government sells its 
property.159  Comparing the fair market price of the property and the 
transaction price is required to ensure that the transaction price is reasonable 
and not merely a gift to the purchasing party.160  Although courts frequently 
use the selling price to evince the legitimacy of the sale, courts rarely analyze a 
transaction where the price of sale was shown to be below the fair market 
value.161  However, by failing to select the highest bid to purchase the 
 
 155. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 (noting that the deed of sale included a restrictive 
covenant, which limited the use of the property to public park purposes).  The court indicates that 
a restrictive covenant does not void a transaction for the sale of land under state law.  Id.  
Additionally, the court held that because the City has made no effort to enforce the covenant, the 
court need not analyze whether it constitutes a perpetuation of the endorsement of religion.  Id. at 
492–93. 
 156. Buono, 527 F.3d at 781. 
 157. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (noting that the property sold is not near or in any 
governmental building, but is merely a public park). 
 158. Instead, the location of the property in question is relevant only for the threshold 
determination of whether the religious monument violates the Establishment Clause, not whether 
the violation has or can be remedied through sale.  See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598 n.48 (1989) (holding that crèche’s location in prominent 
location resulted in an unconstitutional endorsement); O’Connor v. Washburn University, 416 
F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that location of monument weighted toward a finding 
of state endorsement). 
 159. See City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492; Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702. 
 160. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492. 
 161. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702 (noting that the purchaser paid the market rate, as 
determined by the City Assessor), City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492 (noting that the purchaser 
paid a fair market price for the land). Cf. Annunziato v. New Haven Bd. Of Aldermen, 555 
F.Supp 427, 433 (D. Conn. 1982) (finding that a sale of property to a church for $1, $29,999 
below market value, constitutes a gift of the remainder of the market value in violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
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property, a government is arguably selecting a price below fair market value.162  
Nevertheless, a court has indicated that such action is not an unusual 
circumstance that warrants questioning the legitimacy of the transaction.163 
Because of its susceptibility for manipulation and the inability of courts to 
apply factors to sufficiently scrutinize these transactions, the presumption of 
constitutionality is insufficient to protect religious equality and, therefore, 
should be rejected.164  Instead, given the suspicious nature of a government’s 
decision to sell the government property beneath an unconstitutional religious 
monument, courts should presume that the sale is insufficient to end the 
Establishment Clause violation.  However, the government’s decision to sell a 
religious monument that violates the Establishment Clause as well as the 
property beneath it and the presence of any of the above factors might infringe 
the principles of the Establishment, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses. 
B. Establishment Clause 
1. Purpose for the Sale 
A government’s decision to sell a monument that violates the 
Establishment Clause and the property directly beneath it has not been 
satisfactorily analyzed in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.165  As 
the Supreme Court indicated in McCreary County, the purpose of government 
action must be scrutinized when “an understanding of official objective 
emerges from readily discoverable fact.”166  Accordingly, although a 
government proclamation that the sale is designed to end an Establishment 
Clause violation is undoubtedly secular and entitled to deference, this secular 
 
 162. For a definition of fair market value, see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (8th ed. 
2004) (“The price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open 
market and in an arm’s-length transaction.”).  Arguably, when individuals bid to purchase a piece 
of property, the highest price a buyer is willing to pay to a seller would be the fair market value.  
The fair market value of the property, however, could be determined by an independent appraisal. 
 163. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–73 (D. Md. 2005) (noting that 
purchaser did not submit the highest bid but was the original donor and determined by the city to 
be the most prepared to maintain the property). 
 164. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779 n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Seventh 
Circuit’s presumption permitting sale or transfer of land absent unusual circumstances). 
 165.  The Supreme Court has recently been petitioned to decide whether the transfer of 
government property beneath a religious monument that has been held to violate the 
Establishment Clause perpetuates the violation.  See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition of 
Certiorari at 2, Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. filed July 27, 2009).  Van Orden is not helpful 
in determining whether a government’s decision to sell a monument that violates the 
Establishment Clause and the property beneath it is constitutional, because it was designed only 
to scrutinize a monument.  See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (noting that a 
court’s analysis of a monument should be driven both by its nature and by our nation’s history). 
 166. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). 
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purpose cannot be secondary to a religious objective.167  Despite the 
government’s asserted secular purpose, when the government offers the sale 
exclusively to an entity that will undoubtedly preserve the monument, the 
“openly available data” supports the commonsense conclusion that a 
predominately religious objective permeates from the government’s actions.168 
When the government changes the circumstances surrounding an 
unconstitutional religious monument by selling it and the property beneath it, 
the government’s primary purpose is to prevent the removal of the 
monument.169  Although a government is not prohibited from selling or closing 
a public forum,170 it is impermissible for the government to manipulate the 
forum by selling only the property beneath the unconstitutional religious 
monument to individuals that have demonstrated their willingness to preserve 
the monument.  By selling only the property beneath the monument the 
government changes only the form necessary to remove the monument from 
the commands of the Establishment Clause, however the substance of the 
endorsement remains intact.  Additionally, the sale of such a minuscule piece 
of property in the midst of a public park essentially prohibits the purchaser 
from any other effective use besides displaying the monument.  Therefore, in 
order to alleviate the only remaining threats, that the purchaser may remove or 
change the monument, the government offers the property solely to an entity 
that has demonstrated its willingness to preserve the monument.171  
Accordingly, when the government decides to offer its property exclusively to 
such an organization, the government’s primary objective is unmistakably to 
preserve the monument.172  Similarly, the government demonstrates its primary 
objective of preserving the monument when it accepts or solicits additional 
 
 167. See id. at 864. 
 168. Id. at 863. 
 169. See id. at 881 (finding that the predominate purpose of attempting to keep the 
monuments on display in the courthouse was undoubtedly religious). 
 170. See Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009), remanded, 319 F. App’x 753 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a 
government may change the physical nature of its property in order to close a public forum). 
 171. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d. 758, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (Congress did not open the 
bidding to the general public but directed the land to be transferred to the original donor who had 
actively sought to preserve the cross’s display); Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 
693, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2005) (City offered the property exclusively to the original donor of the 
monument); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (City did not solicit alternative bids but sold to an organization commemorating a 
member of the organization that donated the monument). 
 172. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 781–82 (holding that the exclusion of other purchasers and the 
selection of a beneficiary of the land exchange with a significant interest in preserving the cross 
evinces that the entity was a straw purchaser). 
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bids for the property, but selects, despite higher bids, an entity that will 
undoubtedly preserve the display of the monument.173 
As the Supreme Court noted in McCreary County, the display is to be 
viewed in light of the progression leading to its final status.174  Accordingly, a 
“reasonable observer” would be unable to turn a blind eye to several 
circumstances that took place before the monument came to rest on private 
land.  Particularly, in the wake of a determination that the display of the 
religious monument is unconstitutional, a reasonable observer would be 
suspicious of the government’s decision to end an Establishment Clause 
violation by taking a number of painstaking steps to sell the property, in lieu of 
simply removing the monument.  In light of this information, a reasonable 
observer would suspect that the government is favoring the religious message 
associated with the monument it seeks to preserve.175  Additionally, upon the 
realization that the sale was designed in a manner which virtually guarantees 
the continued display of the monument, a reasonable observer would be unable 
to accept the government’s asserted secular purpose.176  In fact, the reasonable 
observer would likely draw the commonsense conclusion that the government 
is either endorsing the monument’s religious message or being controlled by 
the monument’s religious adherents.  Either way the circumstances 
demonstrate that the government is willing to take any and all steps necessary 
to preserve the monument’s display. 
In McCreary County, the Supreme Court held that the Counties’ ploy, to 
circumvent the Establishment Clause and prevent removal of the 
unconstitutionally religious monuments by adding additional monuments to 
change the complexion of the display, violated the Establishment Clause.177  
Similarly, a governmental decision to sell the property beneath an 
unconstitutional religious monument to an entity that will undoubtedly 
preserve the monument is unconstitutional.  By changing the circumstances 
surrounding the monument’s display, the government attempts to not only 
avoid its removal, but also to preserve its display.178  Unfortunately, the world 
 
 173. See id. 
 174. See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 868 (2005). 
 175. See id. at 873. 
 176. See id. at 866. 
 177. Id. at 848, 856–57. 
 178. Compare Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d. 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008)  (“Congress enacted 
legislation requiring the Secretary of the Interior to convey the land beneath the cross to the 
VFW. . . .”), and Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570–71 (D. Md. 2005) 
(City sold the parcel of land where the monument is located), and Mercier v. Fraternal Order of 
Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2005) (City sold the land under and immediately surrounding 
the monument), and Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 
490 (7th Cir. 2000) (City sold the portion of the land on which the statue stands), with McCreary 
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cannot be made anew every morning, and the “implausible claim that 
governmental purpose has changed should not carry the day in a court of law 
any more than in a head with common sense.”179  The phenomenal efforts 
taken to sell the property, in lieu of removal, convey the unmistakable 
impression that the government is willing to take any steps necessary to 
prevent the removal of the monument.180  Furthermore, a government’s 
decision to award the property to an organization that will undoubtedly 
preserve the monument evinces the government’s religious purpose behind the 
sale.  Accordingly, when the government sells its property in a manner 
designed to ensure the continued display of an unconstitutional religious 
monument, the governmental action appears to infringe the Establishment 
Clause. 
2. Continuing Governmental Endorsement of Religion 
Courts agree that “the presence of a religious symbol on once public 
land . . . may still violate the Establishment Clause.”181  Typically, if the 
government sells the property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, 
the subsequent display of the monument is arguably the private expression of 
the purchaser.182  However, if the government maintains any significant control 
over the use of the post-sale property 183 or if the property is not visibly 
distinguished from the surrounding public property,184 the sale may constitute a 
perpetuation of the Establishment Clause violation. 
When a reversionary clause or a restrictive covenant is placed in the deed 
of sale, it draws into question the government’s argument that the post-sale 
display of the monument is private speech.185  A reversionary clause or a 
restrictive covenant is an effective way for the government to control the post-
sale use of the property. 186  Therefore, when the government requires the 
 
County, 545 U.S. at 856–57 (Counties added additional framed documents to the display 
containing the Ten Commandments). 
 179. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866, 874. 
 180. Id. at 869–70. 
 181. Buono, 527 F.3d at 778.  See also City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 496. 
 182. See Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 786 (1995) 
(Souter, J., concurring). 
 183. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 779 (suggesting that the government’s oversight and rights in a 
site after the exchange must be analyzed). 
 184. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490. 
 185. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 781 (holding that supervisory responsibilities with a reversionary 
interest permits the government to retain important property rights). 
 186. See id. (holding that a reversionary interest will show the government’s ongoing control 
over the property and the parties will conduct themselves accordingly); Evans v. Newton, 382 
U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that even in private hands, a park may not be operated for the 
public on a segregated basis if the private owners are nothing more than a trustee); Eaton v. 
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710, 714 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that a reversionary clause in deed permitted 
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purchaser to use the property in a particular manner, the post-sale expression 
on the property is arguably not the sole expression of the purchaser.187  
Additionally, a deed of sale that permits the government to retain the rights to 
supervise, manage, or control the property indicates that the transaction was 
merely a sham to avoid the commands of the Establishment Clause.188  
Arguably the reasonable observer would construe a sale with restrictions 
placed on the use of the property as a scam to enable the government to 
continue the display of the monument.  Accordingly, it is likely that a 
restriction on post-sale use would be a perpetuation of the Establishment 
Clause violation. 
Regardless of whether the government retains any control over the post-
sale use of the property, courts have indicated that the purchased property must 
be visibly differentiated from the surrounding public property.189  In order to 
end a perception of government endorsement after the sale, courts have 
required that the purchased property be differentiated from the public property 
by constructing both a structure that clearly defines the private property or a 
clearly visible disclaimer.190  Accordingly, if the government fails to 
distinguish the purchased property from the surrounding public property the 
display of the continued monument will be perceived as a continued 
governmental endorsement.191 
3. Government Action With the Effect of Advancing Religion 
The Establishment Clause requires that when a government acts, “its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.”192  Government action violates Lemon’s effect prong if “irrespective 
of the government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a 
 
the City to exercise control of the facility to make sure it was being used in a certain way); 
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322–23 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that inclusion of 
a reversionary clause in the deed of sale for a segregated golf course permitted the government to 
exercise “complete present control” over the use of the property). 
 187. It is irrelevant whether or not the government has attempted to enforce the provision 
restricting use because its mere presence is sufficient to ensure compliance.  Cf. City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492–93. 
 188. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 779, 781.  If, however, the government is given responsibilities 
for compensation of a lesser degree, such as up-keep of the property, the responsibilities might be 
insufficient to draw into question the legitimacy of the sale. 
 189. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494–95. 
 190. Id. at 497 (indicating that installing a permanent fence or wall would be sufficient to 
clearly express that the speech was expressive conduct of the private owner). 
 191. Although such action might be sufficient to end the perception of government 
endorsement, it might not be sufficient to remove the post-sale property from the commands of 
the Free Speech Clause.  See infra notes 237–57 and accompanying text. 
 192. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
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message of endorsement or disapproval.”193  However, a religious 
organization’s enjoyment of “incidental” benefits does not violate this 
prohibition against advancing religion.194  Accordingly, when “a reasonable 
person could perceive that a government action conveys a message that 
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred, the 
Establishment Clause has been violated.”195 
Courts have consistently held that when the government sells its property 
beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, a reasonable observer would 
perceive the government’s action as an attempt to dissociate itself from the 
message conveyed by the monument.196  However, a reasonable observer 
would undoubtedly be aware that the government could have dissociated itself 
from the monument’s message by merely removing the monument.  This 
realization alone would demonstrate to a reasonable observer that the 
monument’s continued presence is not “incidental.”  Furthermore, a reasonable 
observer would note that the government has denied access to other religious 
monuments.197  These circumstances indicate that, even if inadvertently, the 
government views the message in a favorable light, because it decided to 
present an opportunity that might enable the monument to avoid removal.198 
Regardless, when a reasonable observer notes that the property is being 
offered exclusively to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness to 
preserve the monument, the sale conveys the unmistakable belief that the 
government favors the monument’s particular religion, even if that is not the 
government’s purpose.199  Similarly, when the government selects a bidder that 
will undoubtedly preserve the monument, despite receiving higher bids, the 
sale conveys the appearance of government favoritism regardless of actual 
purpose.200  Accordingly, a reasonable observer would perceive the 
government’s decision to sell its property, and the manner in which it 
effectuated the sale, as a manipulation of a public forum that is unmistakably 
 
 193. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
 194. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). 
 195. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2005) (citing City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 493). 
 196. Id.; Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 197. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2008) (government did not 
open the bidding for the property to the general public); Mercier, 395 F.3d at 702-03, 705; City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492, 496 (City did not solicit alternate bids for the property); Chambers, 
373 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73. 
 198. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 772. 
 199. See id. at 781 (government did not open the bidding for the property to the general 
public); Mercier, 395 F.3d at 703 (property was solely offered to the Eagles); City of Marshfield, 
203 F.3d at 492 (City did not solicit alternate bids for the property). See also Chambers, 373 F. 
Supp. 2d at 572 (the City awarded the property to the original donor although its bid was smaller 
than those of its competitors). 
 200. Chambers, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73. 
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an advancement of the religious message associated with the monument, 
regardless of the government’s actual purpose. 
C. Free Speech Clause 
“[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing 
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”201  
Undeniably, private religious speech receives as much protection under the 
Free Speech Clause as does secular private speech.202  However, speech that is 
protected from governmental suppression is not thereby guaranteed a forum on 
all property belonging to the government.203  Instead, the right to use 
governmental property for private expression turns on the nature of the 
property.204 
1. Governmental Speech Doctrine 
The Free Speech Clause was designed by the Framers to restrict the 
government in its regulation of private speech.205  In contrast, the “government 
speech doctrine” provides that when the government speaks on its own behalf, 
its speech is not subject to the commands of the Free Speech Clause.206  The 
government speech doctrine also applies when the government “receives 
assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-
controlled message.”207  Therefore, in order to fall within the purview of the 
government speech doctrine, it is vital that the government controls the 
message being conveyed.208 
Though it is not subject to the commands of the Free Speech Clause, 
government speech is not necessarily free from all restraints.209  Government 
speech undoubtedly must conform to the Constitution’s prescriptions; 
specifically, the Establishment and the Equal Protection Clauses.210  
Government speech may also be restrained by laws limiting public official’s 
ability to engage in advocacy.211  Finally, the government or government 
 
 201. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). 
 202. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995). 
 203. Id. at 761. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). 
 209. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1131. 
 210. Id. at 1132, 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 211. Id. at 1132. 
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officials that engage in advocacy will be held accountable by its constituents 
and subjected to the political process.212 
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,213 the Supreme Court indicated that 
“[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property typically represent 
government speech[,]” but also noted that there are situations in which it may 
be difficult to determine whether the government is speaking on its own behalf 
or merely providing a forum for private speech.214  The Court additionally 
noted that property owners will not permit the installation of permanent 
monuments on their property when they do not agree with the message that the 
monument conveys.215  Accordingly, the Court held that when the government 
accepts a permanent monument and subsequently places it in a public park, the 
permanent monument constitutes government speech.216 
When the government has accepted a permanent monument that is found to 
violate the Establishment Clause and subsequently sells the monument and the 
property beneath it, the government speech doctrine appears to be inapplicable 
to the analysis of the post-sale monument.217  In categorizing a permanent 
monument as governmental speech, the Court looks to whether the private 
rights possessed by the monument’s donor have been relinquished.218  
Typically, the private rights of the monument’s donor are relinquished when 
the government accepts a privately donated monument and displays it in a 
public park.219  However, in his concurring opinion in Pleasant Grove City, 
Justice Souter indicated that this presumption is faulty and there are some 
 
 212. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 
(2000)) (“If the citizenry objects [to the governmental message], newly elected officials . . . could 
espouse some different or contrary position.”).  However, if the government sells the property to a 
non-governmental entity, newly elected officials will not be able to reverse the action if the 
constituents disagree with the message being advocated. 
 213. In Pleasant Grove City, the City placed a monument of the Ten Commandments, among 
other monuments, in Pioneer Park.  Id. at 1129.  Summum, a religious organization, repetitively 
sought to erect its own monument containing “the Seven Aphorisms of Summum.”  Id.  However, 
the City denied the requests indicating that it only accepted monuments that directly relate to the 
history of the City or from groups with longstanding ties to the community.  Id. at 1130.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Summum’s Free Speech rights were not violated by the 
City’s decision to accept a monument of the Ten Commandments, while rejecting Summum’s 
monument, which is best perceived as a form of government speech, and, thus, not subject to the 
Free Speech Clause.  Id. at 1138. 
 214. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 1141 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (noting that “accepting the position that public monuments are government speech 
categorically” is problematic). 
 215. Id. at 1133. 
 216. Id. at 1134. 
 217. See Freedom from Religion Found, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th 
Cir. 2005). 
 218. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009). 
 219. Id. at 1136. 
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instances when governmental maintenance of monuments is not government 
speech at all.220  Instead, he indicated that the best way to identify whether a 
permanent monument is government speech, as opposed to private speech, is to 
view the monument through the eyes of a reasonable observer.221 
Under either the majority or the concurrence’s approach in Pleasant Grove 
City, when the government sells the monument, it would not likely be 
perceived as government speech but would instead be perceived as the speech 
of the subsequent purchaser.  Specifically, when a permanent monument is 
placed in a public park and is subsequently sold back to the private donor, or 
some other non-government entity, the monument represents the speech of the 
purchaser, because the private entity has property rights in the monument.  
Even when viewed pursuant to Justice Souter’s proposed analysis, the 
permanent monument would constitute private speech because a reasonable 
observer would know that the monument was originally donated to the 
government and was subsequently sold to a private entity in an attempt to 
remedy the Establishment Clause violation.  Furthermore, because the 
government speech doctrine is limited by the Establishment Clause, the 
monument cannot constitute government speech after it is sold to a 
nongovernment entity if it can arguably be perceived as a remedy to the 
Establishment Clause violation.  This notion is furthered by the requirement 
that disclaimer signs be constructed near the monument after the sale to 
indicate that the monument represents the expression of a private entity and 
that the government is not affiliated with the message.222  Accordingly, by 
selling the permanent monument to a private entity, the permanent monument 
arguably becomes the private speech of the purchaser and might be subject to 
the commands of the Free Speech Clause. 
2. Forum Analysis 
The existence of a right of access to public property and the standards by 
which limitations on such access are evaluated depend on the nature of the 
property at issue.223  In analyzing whether the government’s restriction of 
private speech on government property is permissible, the Supreme Court has 
recognized three types of forums: traditional public forums, designated public 
forums, and nonpublic forums.224  However, the Supreme Court indicated in 
Pleasant Grove City that forum analysis is applicable only to those instances 
where the government-owned property is capable of “accommodating a large 
number of public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land 
 
 220. Id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 221. Id.  See supra notes 40–45. 
 222. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 223. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
 224. Id. at 45–46. 
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or the program.”225  Unlike long-winded speakers, persons distributing leaflets 
and picketers carrying their signs, the Court noted that permanent monuments 
forever endure and do not go home.226 
The Pleasant Grove City Court also noted that if public parks were 
considered traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting privately 
donated monuments, most parks would be required to refuse all donations.227  
Additionally, the Court noted that there is no “long tradition” of allowing 
individuals to permanently occupy public space with any type of monument.228  
The Pleasant Grove City Court went on to distinguish Capitol Square, which 
involved the temporary display of private monuments in public parks, on the 
ground that the monuments were merely temporary and would permit the 
accommodation of several speakers without an influx of clutter.229  Ultimately, 
the Pleasant Grove City Court generally concluded that “forum analysis does 
not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property.”230 
While the Pleasant Grove City Court correctly stated that the forum 
doctrine has been applied only to those instances where the government is 
capable of accommodating large number of public speakers without defeating 
the purpose of the property,231 this assertion misses the point and tells us 
nothing more than the fact that it is dealing with a novel issue.  It is possible 
for any public park, street, or sidewalk to have an influx of speakers who 
simultaneously seek access to a particular quintessential public forum that 
effectively hinders its designated purpose, but this does not necessarily mean 
that forum analysis should not apply.  Furthermore, the Court buffers its 
position by indicating that there is no “long tradition” of permitting the 
construction of permanent monuments in quintessential public forums,232 
which certainly bolsters its conclusion that the public parks are not a traditional 
public forum for the erection of permanent monuments, but is not indicative of 
whether or not forum analysis is applicable. 
When a monument is held to violate the Establishment Clause and the 
government sells the monument and the property beneath it to a non-
government entity, the situation begins to look more like Capitol Square than 
Pleasant Grove City.  Specifically, unlike the privately donated monuments in 
Pleasant Grove City, when the government sells the unconstitutional religious 
monument to a nongovernment entity, the monument represents the expression 
 
 225. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1137. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1138. 
 228. Id. at 1137. 
 229. Id. at 1138.  See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 
(1995) (involving temporary religious displays in state-owned plaza). 
 230. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1138. 
 231. Id. at 1137. 
 232. Id. at 1138. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SELLING THE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BENEATH A RELIGIOUS MONUMENT 331 
of the owner and not the government.  Accordingly, most of the Pleasant 
Grove City Court’s analysis is inapplicable when a non-government entity 
retains the rights associated with the monument and the government has 
attempted to distance itself from the monument and its message. 
Furthermore, the Pleasant Grove City Court’s conclusion must be read 
narrowly, and in conformance with the Court’s premise, to apply to only those 
instances where the permanent monuments installed on public property belong 
to the government and not a private entity.  When a private entity retains rights 
in the monument, the situation is better analyzed pursuant to the Court’s forum 
analysis as applied in Capital Square.  It is impermissible for an administration 
to manipulate a public forum in a manner that permits only certain favored 
groups to take advantage of it.233  Accordingly, when a government permits a 
private entity access to government property to express its views through a 
permanent monument, forum analysis is necessary to preserve the First 
Amendment rights of individuals that are prohibited from constructing 
expressive monuments and to prohibit the government from using a private 
individual to erect a monument that it could not erect itself, while excluding all 
other individuals from expressing a different viewpoint. 
a. Forum Analysis of Public Property Sold to a Private Party 
The mere fact that the government sells its property to a private entity is 
not conclusive of whether the property is subject to forum analysis, because 
First Amendment principles may still govern “even when the government does 
not own the property at issue.”234  Accordingly, the protections of the First 
Amendment may not be circumvented by the government’s manipulation of a 
public park by selling only a portion of it, in an attempt to remedy an 
Establishment Clause violation, because it effectively permits the expression of 
a single viewpoint while excluding all other speakers. 
The threshold issue of whether the property in question remains subject to 
forum analysis requires the determination of “whether the property at issue is 
in fact privately owned.”235  Accordingly, if the transaction for sale fails to 
comply with applicable state and local law, the transaction is invalid, and the 
 
 233. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 764, 766. 
 234. Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated and 
remanded, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009) (in light of Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. 1125). See also 
Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that the First Amendment was violated when a 
corporate-owned municipality restricted individual speech); United Church of Christ v. Gateway 
Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
privately owned sidewalk surrounding privately owned park was a public forum); Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
government always retains authority to close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its 
physical character, or changing its principal use.”). 
 235. See Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1271. 
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property remains part of the public forum.236  Although governments are 
typically cautious to ensure that the transaction complies with applicable 
law,237 even government property sold pursuant to a legally valid transaction 
may be subject to the strictures of forum analysis.238 
Although a forum subject to the constraints of the First Amendment may 
lose its status by closing or selling the entire forum, if government property is 
sold in a piecemeal fashion, the objective physical characteristics of the 
property must be significantly changed in order for the property to lose its 
forum status.239  Permitting a government to sell a small portion of a public 
park, as opposed to closing or selling the entire forum, permits a government to 
manipulate forums protected by the First Amendment.  Specifically, 
manipulation of a forum would permit the government to circumvent forum 
analysis by effectively removing favored expression, which the Government 
cannot itself make, from the commands of the Free Speech Clause in order to 
forbid other speech and contrary viewpoints.  Accordingly, merely selling a 
small piece of property beneath a monument that violated the Establishment 
Clause, in the midst of a public park, is likely to be insufficient to significantly 
change the objective characteristics of the property as to remove it from forum 
analysis.240 
 
 236. See id. (noting that if the land transfer of a portion of a public park is invalid, the 
religious monument remains on a public forum). 
 237. Compare Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005) (the 
sale complied with Wisconsin state law), and Freedom from Religious Found. v. City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (the sale of the property complied with the 
applicable Wisconsin law governing the sale of land by municipalities), with Chambers v. City of 
Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–72 (D. Md. 2005) (City failed to comply with its procedural 
requirements for the sale of public land). 
 238. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1270. 
 239. Id. at 1271.  See Hawkins v. City and County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1284, 1287 
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that constructing the Galleria, an open air, glass-covered pedestrian 
walkway, which was formerly a public street, was a sufficient alteration of characteristics and 
function to remove forum status); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 505 U.S. at 700 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that to change a property’s public forum status, the state 
“must alter the objective physical character or uses of the property”). 
 240. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (noting that 
government’s intentions and efforts to remove a piece of government property by transferring it 
to private owners is insufficient to dictate the status of the property); Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 
1270 (noting that a city’s intention and efforts to remove a piece of property does not dictate the 
property’s status).  The portion of the public park sold as a result of the finding of an 
Establishment Clause violation is generally insufficient in size to serve any other significant 
purpose than to display a monument or to engage in other expressive conduct.  Compare 
Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1284, 1287 (holding that former public street which is now a glass-covered 
pedestrian walkway is a sufficient alteration of characteristics and function to remove forum 
status), and Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1271 (holding that a fence and disclaimer surrounding a 
small parcel of property in the midst of a public park does not necessarily remove the property 
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In addition to having significantly different physical characteristics, the 
property will not lose its forum status if it merely continues “to serve the same 
primary function as it did before the [sale].”241  When the government decides 
to sell the property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, the 
property typically continues to display the monument after the sale.242  
Accordingly, if the property continues to display the religious monument or 
another expressive monument, the property arguably serves the same primary 
function as it did before the sale, and, thus, remains part of the public forum. 
Lastly, the property will not lose its forum status if the government 
remains “inextricably intertwined with the ongoing operation” of the 
property.243  If the deed of sale includes a reversionary clause or a restrictive 
covenant that mandates the manner in which the property is to be used, the 
government exercises great control over the use of the property.  Similarly, the 
government is excessively involved with the use of the property if it retains the 
right to supervise, manage, or control the property.244  Accordingly, unless the 
purchaser is granted ownership and usage rights that are not significantly 
hindered through restriction or government oversight, the property will remain 
subject to forum analysis. 
Accordingly, when the government sells a monument that violates the 
Establishment Clause and only the portion of the public park beneath the 
monument, the post-sale use and physical characteristics will likely be 
insufficient to remove the property from forum analysis. 
b. Traditional Public Forum 
“Traditional public forums” are those places that “have immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and. . . .used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”245  
 
from forum analysis), with Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256 
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that signs posed at all entrance to Plaza and its differentiation from the 
surrounding sidewalks were sufficient objective, physical characteristics to demonstrate that the 
Plaza is privately owned). 
 241. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1270. 
 242. See Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 
944 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no alteration because the sidewalk still performed the same role as it 
did previously); First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 
1128 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding the fact that an easement served the same purpose as a public 
sidewalk “a persuasive indication that the easement is a traditional public forum”). 
 243. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d at 1270 (citing Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1256–58).  
The expression, however, must be shown to be the private expression of a non-government entity, 
through disclaimer signs or by the government relinquishing its rights to the monument, in order 
to avoid the application of the government speech doctrine.  See supra notes 200–15. 
 244. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 245. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting 
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
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Typically, Courts have viewed streets, sidewalks, and parks as the 
quintessential public forums that have “by long tradition or by government 
fiat. . . .been devoted to assembly and debate.”246  The Supreme Court has been 
unwilling to extend traditional public forum status beyond these historic 
confines or to areas where history is lacking.247 
A speaker may not be excluded from a traditional public forum based on 
the content of his speech, unless the restriction is “necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
interest.”248  However, a reasonable, content-neutral time, place, or manner 
restriction that is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest” 
that “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication” is 
permissible.249 
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that a public park is not a 
traditional public forum for the construction of permanent monuments, because 
public parks lack a “long tradition” of being held open to the public for 
permitting people to construct permanent monuments.250  Accordingly, a 
speaker’s desire to erect a permanent monument in a public park, which also 
houses a permanent monument that was sold to a non-governmental entity in 
an attempt to remedy an Establishment Clause violation, would unlikely be 
analyzed as a traditional public forum. 
c. Designated Public Forum 
A government may create a “designated public forum” by intentionally 
opening property that has not traditionally been used as a public forum for use 
by the public at large for expressive activities.251  However, a designated 
public forum cannot be created by government inaction or limited disclosure; 
instead, the government must intentionally open a nontraditional forum for the 
purpose of public expression.252  Though the government is not required to 
keep a designated forum open indefinitely, so long as the forum remains open, 
it is subject to the same restrictions as a traditional public forum.253  When a 
government decision to sell a permanent monument in a public park is 
designed to remedy the Establishment Clause violation, the sale would not 
likely open a designated public forum for the construction of permanent 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998). 
 248. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 249. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 250. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1137 (2009). 
 251. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
 252. Id.  See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758 (1995) 
(noting that the Board has permitted a variety of unattended displays in the park). 
 253. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 802. 
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monuments in a public park because the government does not intend to and 
cannot accidentally create a public forum. 
d. Nonpublic Forum 
Because the construction of a permanent monument in a public park is 
neither a traditional or designated public forum, it must be characterized as a 
nonpublic forum.254  In a nonpublic forum, government may, in addition to 
time, place, and manner regulations, “reserve the forum for its intended 
purposes. . . .as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort 
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s 
view.”255  The government, like a property owner, has the authority to preserve 
its property for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.256 
The government undoubtedly has reasonable interests in forbidding the 
construction of permanent monuments in public parks in order to prevent 
against the influx of clutter and to preserve the purpose of the government 
property.  However, when the government sells a permanent monument and a 
portion of the public park beneath it in an attempt to remedy an Establishment 
Clause violation, the government cannot then deny the construction of a 
similar monument expressing a different viewpoint.  Specifically, when the 
government permits the construction or display of a religious monument in a 
nonpublic forum that it could not construct or display on its own while denying 
similar access to different religious monuments, the government is 
impermissibly discriminating on account of viewpoint.  Accordingly, by 
permitting access to a government favored religious monument, while 
discriminating against other viewpoints, the government infringes on the Free 
Speech rights of an entity seeking equal access to the nonpublic forum to 
convey a different viewpoint. 
D. Equal Protection Clause 
In light of the shaky and inconsistent tests applicable to Establishment 
Clause claims, scholars have proposed that new tools, specifically the Equal 
Protection Clause, be used to preserve religious equality.257  In theory, the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination against religion and requires 
that all religions be treated equally under the law.258  Although scholars have 
 
 254. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Susan Gellman & Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shall Use The Equal Protection 
Clause For Religion Cases (Not Just The Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 
741–43 (2008) (proposing that an Equal Protection Clause claim be used in addition to the typical 
Establishment Clause claim). 
 258. Shidler v. Moore, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1065 (N.D. Ind. 2006). 
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advocated its use, the Equal Protection Clause has not been successfully 
invoked or adopted by a court in a challenge against government action that 
allegedly discriminates based on religion.259  However, the Equal Protection 
Clause has successfully been invoked to prohibit a government from granting 
access to government property for the expression of speech it deems 
acceptable, while denying use to less favored speech.260 
Nevertheless, if the government were to use religion to determine the 
purchaser of the property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument, the 
governmental action would be subject to the commands of the Equal Protection 
Clause.261  Accordingly, when the government selects its purchaser on account 
of religion, the decision is suspect and should be subject to the strictest 
scrutiny.262  When the government decides to extend an offer for the sale of a 
portion of a public park only to an entity that has demonstrated its willingness 
to preserve the monument, the government effectively discriminates against 
those who hold beliefs inconsistent with the monument’s message.263  
Similarly, if the government rejects higher bids in order to sell the property to 
an entity that will undoubtedly preserve the monument,264 the government is 
effectively discriminating on account of religion.  A government could attempt 
to justify its actions by explaining that nonadherents would desecrate the 
monument or demonstrate feelings of ill will towards the monument and its 
associated beliefs.  However, even if this explanation were considered a 
compelling state interest, it would not be narrowly tailored, because the 
government could simply remove the monument without discriminating on 
account of religion and avoid the perceived harms of a public sale.  
Accordingly, a governmental decision to sell the property to an entity that has 
demonstrated its willingness to preserve the monument’s display appears to 
run counter to the principles of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
 259. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (noting there is no justification for applying the Equal 
Protection’s strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test). 
 260. Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
 261. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).  Discrimination of this nature would 
also run counter to the equality principles of the Establishment Clause.  See Bd. of Educ. of 
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.  Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994). 
 262. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). 
 263. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the 
purchaser was the original donor of the monument). 
 264. Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005) (City failed to 
comply with procedural requirements for the sale of public land and despite the fact that the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles, the original donor of the unconstitutional religious monument, did not 
submit the highest bid, the property was sold to them upon the determination that they would be 
able to best take care of the monument). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] SELLING THE GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BENEATH A RELIGIOUS MONUMENT 337 
E. Contempt of Court 
Courts of equity have the inherent power to preserve the status quo of a 
case in which it has jurisdiction in order to protect its ability to render 
judgments.265  Any improper interference with property that is in custody of 
the law is contempt of court.266  Additionally, the willful diversion of the 
property, which is the subject matter of a pending suit, beyond the reach of the 
court “to defeat any decree which the court might ultimately make in the 
cause” may also constitute contempt.267 
When the government sells the unconstitutional religious monument and 
the property beneath it, in anticipation of litigation or after an order requiring 
the monument’s removal, the governmental conduct can be perceived as an 
attempt to remove the property from the reach of the court.  Although the 
government’s actions might arguably remedy an Establishment Clause 
violation, such action violates an injunction that prohibits the monument’s 
display or mandates its removal.268  Furthermore, this disruptive conduct not 
only jeopardizes the effect of the court’s order, but also undercuts its ability to 
enter and effectuate future orders.269  Accordingly, the government’s willful 
decision to sell the government property beneath the monument is an attempt 
to evade the injunctive order and, thus, amounts to contempt.270  Furthermore, 
if it is shown that the purchaser had knowledge of the injunction at the time of 
the purchase, the purchaser could likely be held in contempt for acting in 
concert with the government in evading the injunction.271 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The manipulation of public parks in order to display passive religious 
monuments might not be the prevention of a “national ecclesiastical 
 
 265. U.S. v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 266. See Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 219 (1932). 
 267. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 363 F.2d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 1966) 
(finding contempt where the disbursement of monies seriously impaired the litigation). 
 268. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 2008) (The District Court “entered a 
permanent injunction ordering that the ‘Defendants, their employees, agents, and those in active 
concert with Defendants, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from permitting display 
of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.”).  Although the 
argument can be made that the given property is no longer being displayed on the “government 
property” this would just require injunctions to be more specific in their land descriptions. 
 269. See Hall, 472 U.S. at 265 (applying same rationale to evasion of desegregation 
injunction). 
 270. See Buono, 527 F.3d at 778, 771–82 (noting that the transfer of property was designed to 
evade the permanent injunction enjoining the display of the cross). 
 271. Roe v. Operation Rescue, 54 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that urging others to 
participate in conduct that violates the injunction may support a finding of contempt against the 
participants). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
338 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:301 
establishment” that the founders feared and hoped to thwart when enacting the 
Establishment Clause.272  However, permitting the government to manipulate 
its property in a manner that allows the continued display of an 
unconstitutional religious monument, runs counter to the Constitution’s 
encouragement of equality and diversity.273  Although courts across the nation 
have continually struggled to draw a satisfactory line to adequately protect the 
church and the state from unnecessary intrusion into the sphere of the other, 
permitting governments to sell an unconstitutional religious monument and the 
property beneath it to ensure its continued display enables favored religious 
messages to flourish in public parks while avoiding the commands of the 
Establishment Clause. 
Courts have consistently brought attention to the fact that the current 
presumption of constitutionality is highly susceptible to manipulation; thus, 
evincing the need for a standard that will curb this obvious danger and thwart 
extraordinary governmental efforts to preserve the continued display of 
unconstitutional religious monuments.  Accordingly, courts should subject 
these suspect transactions to the highest level of scrutiny, and courts must 
analyze these sales on a transaction-by-transaction basis examining the form 
and substance to ensure that the Establishment Clause violation has ceased. 
However, in light of the current presumption and the accompanying 
factors’ inability to protect religious liberty against even the most blatant 
manipulations, a court should begin its analysis with the strong presumption 
that the sale of the monument and the property beneath it is insufficient to end 
the Establishment Clause violation.  In fact, the government’s decision to sell 
the unconstitutional monument and the property beneath it, in lieu of removal, 
is the precise religious favoritism that the Establishment Clause forbids. 
Even if one were to assume that a sale would remedy the Establishment 
Clause violation, courts must analyze the transaction with an emphasis on 
equality, fairness, and neutrality to prevent the perception that the government 
is favoring the religious beliefs in question.  Specifically, Courts should ensure 
that all individuals who desire to purchase the unconstitutional monument and 
the property beneath it are afforded an opportunity to do so and the property is 
awarded to the highest bidder.  Additionally, courts should ensure that the 
 
 272. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (quoting 3 JOSEPH A. STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & 
Co. 1833)). 
 273. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition of Certiorari at 3, Kempthorne v. Buono, No. 08-
472, (2008) (asking the Supreme Court “[w]hether, after a court has held that the presence of a 
sectarian religious symbol on government land violates the Establishment Clause, the transfer of 
that land perpetuates the Establishment Clause violation”). 
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government retains no control over, or rights in, the post-sale use of the 
property. 
Even if a court concludes that the monument and the property beneath it 
were sold in a manner that ends the perception of government endorsement, the 
governmental manipulation of its public park would likely subject the post-sale 
monument to the strictures of forum analysis.  Specifically, if the monument is 
truly private speech and if the property has not undergone significant physical 
changes or is not used in a significantly different way, the Free Speech Clause 
requires equal access to monuments expressing different religious viewpoints.  
Accordingly, if the government prohibits the construction of any similar 
monument in the forum that expresses a different viewpoint, the denial of 
access may run counter to the Free Speech Clause. 
Therefore, in order to properly preserve religious rights, courts must either 
simply forbid governments from selling a monument and the property beneath 
it, in lieu of merely removing the monument, in an attempt to remedy an 
Establishment Clause violation or must subject the transaction to the strictest 
scrutiny.  To permit any lesser protection for such a sacred right would permit 
the government to manipulate its forums to ensure the continued display of a 
favored, unconstitutional religious monument, while excluding all other non-
favored viewpoints.  Only the strictest scrutiny of the sale of government 
property beneath an unconstitutional religious monument will ensure that the 
government will act with neutrality between religions and between religion and 
non-religion.  Most importantly, the strictest scrutiny is necessary to preserve 
the religious equality principles guaranteed by the Constitution’s 
Establishment, Free Speech, and Equal Protection Clauses. 
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